Globalisation and Democracy: The Concept of Cosmopolitanism by Seitkazin, Ruslan
100
sz
ak
ma
i f
ór
um
 •
RU S L A N S E I T K A Z I N •  G L OBA L I S AT ION A N D DE MO C R AC Y:  T H E C ONC E P T OF C O S MOP OL I TA N I S M
PRO PUBLICO BONO – Magyar Közigazgatás, 2019/2, 100–109. • DOI: 10.32575/ppb.2019.2 .6
Ruslan Seitkazin
GLOBALISATION AND DEMOCRACY: 
THE CONCEPT OF COSMOPOLITANISM
Ruslan Seitkazin, PhD student of the Doctoral School of Public Administration Sciences, 
National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary, seitkazin.ruslan@gmail.com
To what extent can democracy be extended beyond borders? It was given for granted that the 
values and norms of democracy could only be applied within the boundaries of a  country. 
Yet, over the past twenty years, it has been progressively debated that democracy can also affect 
global politics and international organizations. Today, the methods the world has for enforcing 
international law is too much dependent on whether a powerful geo-political force like the US 
or Russia is eager to commit resources to the issue. In such occasions, “a big state” will more 
likely do what it wants, acting simply in its own interests. It is argued that international law 
enforcement must not rely on some nation states lending part of their military apparatus to global 
or regional democratic entities, but instead, a military force must be globally recruited based on 
individuals, not countries. However, in the modern world such institutions are deficient, and 
therefore often rely on a big state to act. In contrast, cosmopolitan democracy is more about seeking 
a new enforcement approach that is more genuinely transnational. It is suggested that within 
the framework of cosmopolitan law, there is an opportunity of improving, rather enhancing both 
our means of enforcement and our international organisations. This article reviews the idea of 
cosmopolitan democracy, a project of normative political theory started to develop since the early 
1990s put forward by David Held, concentrating on its ability to offer a new approach to the 
identity problem.
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The victory of the West over the Soviet regime inspired the hope that international 
relations can be driven by the ideals of the rule of law and democracy. The concept of 
globalising democracy may be understood as a  phenomenon that impacts the internal 
modes of different countries, but it could also be seen as a  new way of regulating and 
understanding political relations worldwide, and since the threat of nuclear war had 
receded, western political actors were urged to actively apply their tenets of the rule of 
law within the domain of international affairs. This marks a central notion underpinning 
cosmopolitan democracy, which more precisely, could be described as the endeavour to 
globalise democratic principles while, simultaneously, democratising globalisation.1 In the 
1990s, the political idea of cosmopolitan democracy was developed by a group of thinkers, 
such as David Held, for example, within the development of institutional connections 
between national civil communities that strengthen democratic principles within both the 
international arena and a country.2
In short, cosmopolitan democracy is a  normative project of political theory that 
attempts to address some of the procedures, principles and values of democracy within 
a  system of global policy. The major purpose is to provide a  voice to the people of the 
world community on an institutional level that parallels governments. “We live today 
at a  fundamental point of transition”, states David Held in introducing the scheme for 
cosmopolitan democracy.3 In such a transitional stage, a vast discrepancy can be identified 
between the ideals of democracy and the globalised concept of power. It is noteworthy that 
a remedy is perceived in “the entrenchment of democratic autonomy on a cosmopolitan 
basis”4 by deepening and extending democracy across nations, regions and global 
networks There is a  belief underlying this perception that the separation between the 
foreign and domestic spheres of politics is continually being blurred5 and that the idea 
of state sovereignty is unchallenged and indivisible.6 However, globalisation is viewed as 
a linear or irreversible historical process and the mode of the nation state will ultimately be 
eclipsed by the new forces it has set in motion. Furthermore, globalisation neither dissolves 
nor minimises country power, but rather changes its nature. Yet, Held suggests that five 
“disjunctures” have emerged between globalisation and the nation state. It was argued 
that these disjunctures between globalisation and the nation state require cosmopolitan 
democracy in order to tackle the following issues, namely the regulation of global financial 
markets, the international drugs trade, and the regulation of nuclear waste.7 In addition, 
Held recognises recurring cosmopolitan realities that help to increase the probability of 
cosmopolitan democracy. Although it was assumed that the formation of global society 
1 Held 2002.
2 Archibugi 2004. 
3 Held 2006, 304.
4 Held 2006, 305.
5 McGrew 1997, 13.
6 Rosenau 2005, 73.
7 Held et al. 1999.
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is simply represented in globalisation, the tenets of egalitarian individualism, impartial 
reasoning and reciprocal recognition, have already been determined as a  set of legal 
frameworks of global and regional governance in certain respects. This was justified by 
examples, such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International Bill of Human 
Rights, the Covenants of Rights and the statute of the International Criminal Court. 
Interestingly, in his model for the new order, Held does not seek an entire replacement of 
state-based democracy by cosmopolitan democracy. Conversely, Held accentuates the new 
reformation from “a community of fate within boundaries” of the country to “overlapping 
communities of fate”.8
Generally speaking, democracy was invented and established within territorially 
bounded political communities. It has been acknowledged that democracy of nation 
states is embedded in the contemporary state, and a  fixed territory is bounded. Yet, 
the territorial basis of the autonomy of the state and nation state democracies has been 
called into question by globalisation. The perception of fixed people within a  country 
has been challenged by asylum seekers and other forms of international immigration, as 
well as holders of dual or multiple citizenships. Additionally, the idea of citizens’ rule is 
questioned by the fact that people of various nations have no opportunity to grant their 
consent to decisions that influence them, despite the fact that those are made elsewhere. 
The notion of popular sovereignty is now restricted by international agreements, and often 
the process of decision-making at international level excludes the involvement of ordinary 
people. It has been argued that people have less input in international and domestic policies 
than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) does, for example. It is argued that people 
have minimal control over international forces and agencies, and that they do not have 
a means or channel through which to voice their agreements or disagreements. Moreover, 
the notion of a  politically autonomous, or self-governing community is undermined 
by internationalisation. National organisations by no means merely define policies for 
themselves, and states by no means define what is appropriate or right for their own 
residents.
Nevertheless, the basis of democratic legitimacy, or a  tenet of the agreement through 
elections, is also open to challenge, and the relevance and scope of this tenet is agreed 
by processes of global and regional restructuring. Mechanisms of accountability might 
be weakened and obscured by the system of overlapping political structures. The nature 
of accountability of NATO, multinational corporations (MNCs) and IMF to the general 
public of governments, in which they work, or to the various groups they impact beyond 
a given state, continues to be an acute question. It is worth noting that there is an issue 
about the adequate locus for the democratic articulation of the political good, and about the 
appropriate location of people, democracy and politics. It is suggested that if the agent at the 
centre of contemporary political discourse, be a group or person, is locked into the diversity 
8 Held 1998, 24.
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of overlapping units – international and domestic – then the proper “home” of democracy 
and politics becomes a complicating and puzzling issue. Therefore, Held examines whether 
the nation state can remain at the heart of democratic thought, and whether it is in fact 
the most suitable locus for democracy. It could be argued that all of these challenges show 
that democracy might not operate in the globalising world, in which the imperative of 
competition between nation states deprives citizens of their power and voice. Moreover, 
it is believed that the traditional democracies derived from nation states are unable to 
provide humane governance. Thus, if the idea of democracy is taken seriously, does this 
mean that we should extend the democratic tenet to international relations? Furthermore, 
it is noted that even if society or country relations are democratised, the country cannot 
exert efficient regulation over global platforms. In addition, many countries in the Global 
South are progressively disempowered as independent, rather than autonomous actors and 
therefore, democratisation should expand via ‘transnational market forces’.9 Furthermore, 
the cosmopolitan democratic scheme aims to democratise global levels of decision-making 
that are predominated by market forces and states. It expands the scope of democratisation 
beyond society and state relations, highlighting accountability, participation, agenda-
setting and law-making by the citizens of the world using their representatives. Now, it is 
crucial to clarify who these people are. For instance, it is noted that people are represented 
by members of the global civil society, constituting the Citizen Assembly or the UN People’s 
Assembly. Yet, Held proposes that people’s constituencies will be determined according to 
the scope and nature of debatable transnational problems with the probability of general 
referenda cutting through countries and nations. It has been argued that democratic 
entities must be developed and redesigned to reflect issues of multiplicity and questions 
that impact and gather people together, irrespective of whether they are in one country 
or another. What is more, cosmopolitan democracy underlines that democracy within 
democratic relations and a concrete community are interdependent, and that new binding 
and organisational mechanisms should be launched if democracy is to develop and survive 
in the future.
Notwithstanding this, proponents of cosmopolitan democracy believe that, in the short 
term, this could alter the UN Security Council by providing the Third World an important 
voice and reforming the veto system. It has been proposed to establish a  second UN 
chamber and to create regional parliaments that improve the role of institutions, such as the 
European Parliament. Moreover, it has also been suggested that an obligatory jurisdiction 
be created before the International Court and a new international Human Rights Court 
be organised.10 However, in the long term, there is a hope that a global parliament will be 
produced by cosmopolitan democracy, the dividing of economic and political interests, 
and electoral processes and the public findings of consultative assemblies. It would also 
provide an interlinked global legal system that comprises elements of civil and criminal 
9 Falk 1995, 120.
10 Archibugi 1995.
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law and the permanent movement of an increasing portion of coercive capacity in nation 
states to global and regional bodies. Yet, how could these ideas be implemented and how 
feasible are they?
It is important to note that the normative stance, which lies behind cosmopolitan 
democracy, is fairly robust. It stresses the significance of individualistic morality, where 
every citizen is equal.11 It also emphasises the extent of the threats and goals that are general 
to humanity as a whole.12 Moreover, if the idea of a “civilisation community of fate”13 is 
accepted, it will be suggested to improve the democratic nature of the international entities 
responsible for solving global problems. It is argued that international governmental 
organisations (IGOs) must conduct relations between countries and have nothing 
“directly to do with cosmopolitan citizenship”.14 Held acknowledges that the UN is an 
international body, but also emphasises that it has also developed an innovative system 
of global governance.15 Yet, the tenet of national self-determination is also proclaimed in 
the UN Charter, which conflicts with cosmopolitanism. It is difficult to believe that the 
UN could have been developed and maintained without the principles of national self-
determination. Moreover, the national self-determination is much more globally adopted 
than that of fundamental human rights. It means not only that there are some non-liberal 
democratic countries that sustain only the rights of their own people. Put precisely, no 
country implements the tenet of universal human rights. Global human rights must 
meet global human commitments to assure the standard rights of everyone else, but 
arguably, the people in developed states do not fulfil such commitments for those in 
the developing countries. Nevertheless, it could be noted that after World War II, both 
the cosmopolitan and nationalist concepts have fostered the development of global order, 
even though these tenets contradict each other in some respects. In addition, the tenet of 
national self-determination is more critical for the UN, and for the UN it could operate 
without cosmopolitan ideas, for instance, as a  mere alliance of multinational states for 
global security without the promotion of human rights. On the contrary, many states 
including China would not engage with and maintain the UN without the tenet of national 
self-determination. This principle allows different country modes to actively participate 
in a  common sphere and is a  prerogative for global order. As for the other IGOs, Held 
underestimates the reality of nationalists, arguing that the new structures of economic 
regulation are indispensable to conquering the fragmentation of policy-making in tackling 
the issues of the global economy. Yet, organisations, such as the World Bank, OECD and 
IMF are international, even though global and transnational impacts can be exerted. It is 
believed that such institutions have made some achievements in transnational economic 
11 Coates 2000.
12 Held 2006.
13 Beck 2006, 7.
14 Miller 1999, 74.
15 Held 2002, 38. 
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co-ordination and because of internationality, they have influence on the global economy.16 
The effectiveness of IGOs depends on the widely based maintenance of countries, which 
appeal to their citizens to contribute to them. It is noted that since ‘technocratic elites 
are vulnerable’, the legitimacy of the maintenance of democratic states is needed by 
IGOs.17 Moreover, Held supports the goal of establishing a new economic agency at the 
international level; however, there is a big gap between the practicability of launching a new 
international entity and a new universal agency. Held’s over-evaluation of cosmopolitan 
realities derives from his narrow concept of the country. He asserts that the appearance 
of “overlapping communities of fate” in the process of globalisation has demoralised the 
effectiveness of the country as the only community of fate. Notwithstanding this, Held 
also states that the national interest frequently takes precedent over global issues, and this 
arouses controversy in the long-term for international communities. For instance, the 
1992 bio-diversity protocol in Brazil was not signed by the USA,18 and this shows how 
the international community was helpless in imposing the environmental agenda that was 
a priority issue for many countries. Thereby, it was proposed that more legal improvements 
should be granted in order to enhance the role of international communities by creating 
a global parliament, for example.19 However, this idea seems unnecessary and unfeasible.
Furthermore, Held believes that there is a deficiency of democratic tenets in decision-
making, for instance, in the regulation of transnational finance or in non-renewable 
resources. However, it is doubtful whether ordinary people feel that they really need to 
express their opinions on the issues, or that they desire to have an impact on them. Quite 
the opposite, people are most concerned with the problems that influence them directly.20 
In addition, democracy is currently challenged by a  deficiency of interest in politics, 
especially among youths, as the rate of voting turnouts shows.21 Moreover, a proposition 
that the global parliament will facilitate a  sense of cosmopolitan identity is dubious. 
In addition, the matter of non-democratic countries clearly constitutes a major obstacle 
to overcome with respect to the idea of a global parliament. If countries are not embedded 
into democratic principles, it is to be expected that they abide by the values of democracy 
on the global level. It could also be suggested that the global parliament project can bring 
some difficulties; however, what if the focus were to move towards existing organisations 
with the aim of bringing about the equality of all populations? In other words, the equal 
engagement of all state and non-state actors in the global arena. For example, there have 
been attempts to improve the involvement and status of non-state players within its system, 
namely by calling into existence the Non-Governmental Liaison Service for the onward 
integration of NGOs into the policy-making process and enhancing collaboration between 
16 Canovan 2001.
17 Hirst 2000, 185.
18 Birch 1993.
19 Held 2006.
20 Analysis 2011.
21 UK Political Info 2010.
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civil society groups and the UN agencies.22 In addition, another trend within the UN is 
presented by global partnerships, such as the Millennium Development Goals, which 
include a diversity of actors amongst non-state and state members. In spite of criticism 
by Held of the UN, its effectiveness has hardly been questioned since its establishment in 
1945.23
Above all, although Held admits the distinctions between individual states and their 
positions within different power blocks, he does not recognise the concept of power and 
sovereignty that cannot be structured irrespective of modern realities of power. In other 
words, if the UN’s function is to operate global governance, which was a major goal of 
it, then more strength and scope must be given in order to achieve this role effectively.24 
However, this might only be reached by changing its constitutional system, particularly 
by transforming the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and supplementing executive 
mechanisms. It is noted that the lack of norms of enforcement measures will remain 
exclusively symbolic values, which are inadequate to resolving or preventing international 
conflicts and events, such as civil wars or crimes against humanity.25 It could be proposed 
that the UN’s jurisdiction is made obligatory and that it adheres to tenets of individual 
responsibility for war crimes and therefore, can be associated as a real guarantor of justice. 
This will help to enhance the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights into a mandatory 
set of principles by which to abide. For instance, in 2005 the UN considered the plan of 
Responsibility to Protect at the UN World Summit, where it was argued that states must 
advocate their residents from violation and crimes, as well as failing to do so. For such 
countries, this will result in collective action through the Security Council with different 
entities. This first move can make the aim of transparency and accountability of different 
international entities more reachable.
“The only forum in which genuine democracy occurs is within national boundaries”26 is 
a simple statement. Hypothetically, if democracy will be formed as a set of ideals that might 
be performed to different degrees, it can be argued that the international order must be 
democratised, as Held suggests. This may potentially only be implemented by enhancing 
the UN’s role and modes of international law. Therefore, it is logical that ethical values 
are conceived to apply to international relations. In addition, it is significant to make 
international law more workable and expand the scope of liabilities of the ICJ with respect 
to the tenet of individual liability.27 It could also be proposed that the UN has an objective 
to advocate both a  society of states and a  society of people equally.28 Concentrating on 
22 Boutros-Ghali 1996, 1–52.
23 Wolf 2004.
24 Boutros-Ghali 2000.
25 Archibugi 1995. 
26 Kymlicka 1999, 124.
27 Coates 2000.
28 Boutros-Ghali 2000.
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strengthening democracy within existing IGOs and individual countries, like the IMF or 
the UN, a scheme for global democracy can be moved within the domain of probability.29 
This does not mean that one must give up the very remote view of a borderless, cosmopolitan 
global order. Nevertheless, it is much more achievable to ask what else must be done to 
create greater transparency, justice and accountability within a cosmopolitan system.
Nevertheless, the number of impressive scholarly work provides depth and extent 
analysis of cosmopolitan democracy, yet it has led to critiques comprising valuable ideas 
concerning the normative and empirical limitations, practical constraints and more 
importantly, the desirability of expanding democracy at the global arena. This resulted 
an enriched debate of the architecture of global governance in the future. It is clear that 
a gradualist methodology in the way of cosmopolitanism, which eliminates some of the 
obstacles the cosmopolitan democracy project faces is needed to be examined. However, 
this is a task for future study.
29 Saward 2000.
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